"Mario" <***@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<firstname.lastname@example.org>...
Post by Mario
Otro con extrañas conspiranoias. A ver, hombre, que parece que ni siquiera
de lo que atacais conoceis bien lo que decís. Los EEUU son dueños de las
mayores empresas petrolíferas del mundo, y ya lo eran antes de la guerra,
abarcan y abarcaban todo el poder antes de que sucediera nada. Si EEUU
quiere apoderarse del petróleo, las compaías norteamericanas de petroleo no
tienen más que lanzar una opa que dejarían temblando a las empresas
petrolíferas del mundo entero. Las razones de la invasión son otras, y están
mucho más enmarcadas dentro del ámbito estratégico militar que en ningún
negocio de mercado. La invasión se relaciona claramente con el próximo
Israel y con los países árabes circundantes, que son una clarísima amenaza
para los EEUU e Israel en este momento, como por ejemplo las armas atómicas
de Irán, así como el posible desarrollo de estas armas dentro de la misma
Irak o la necesidad de controlar al principal país subvencionador del
terrorismo palestino. Estas son las verdaderas razones.
Perdona pero infórmate un poquito más, fuentes: el mismo Cheney y el
hermano de Bush, el antiguo vice presidente Dan Quayle y demás gente
Aquí verás el manifiesto "neocon" sobre lo que el mundo debe de ser
---> un imperio americano. ***No lo digo yo***, lo dicen ellos
24 feb 2003
"Sometimes the question is put: Why now with Iraq? I think the answer
in part is that we're late and we should have done this a long time
ago and the fact that we didn't do it a long time ago, the fact that
we tolerated the expulsion of the inspectors, was a tribute to weak
leadership at the time that that took place
. The Clinton
administration chose not to respond or not to respond in a substantial
way. That was a terrible mistake
"[As for the other members of the 'axis of evil'] we have to deal with
all three and we'll deal with each in its own way. In the case of
Iran, I think that place is going to fall apart because the mullahs
are so unpopular. It may take a little while but it's going to happen.
In the case of North Korea, we've got an obviously very delicate
situation because of the damage that the North Koreans could inflict
instantaneously on South Koreans. So we have to be sensitive to South
Korean concerns as we deal with it and we have to do things,
sometimes, one at a time."
Perle: "Let me say a word about what you call the new strategy of
preemption. There's nothing new about preemption. If you know that you
are about to be attacked, it is certainly sensible if you can act
first and avoid that attack to do so. I don't think anybody would
dispute that. So then the question is how imminent must the attack be
to justify the preemptive response. Here, we need to think more
carefully about the concept of imminence. In 1981, the Israelis, after
a long and, I gather, a heated cabinet debate, decided to destroy the
reactor that Chirac had sent to Osirak, not because it was about to
produce nuclear weapons. It wasn't. It was about to produce plutonium
and it was under IAEA safeguards so the Iraqis would have had to
siphon off small, undetectable quantities of plutonium and it would
have taken them time to build a nuclear weapon based on what they
would get from the Osirak reactor. But, nevertheless, the Israelis
decided to strike some years in advance of the production of the
nuclear weapon that they were concerned about.
O sea, que cualquier acción que se pueda interpretar como una amenaza
justifica un bombardeo y/o invasión. Estos chicos son los herederos de
Justificaciones para la invasión de Irak:
The "immediate military threat" might be held at bay for the moment.
"But even a contained Saddam" was "harmful to stability and to
positive change in the region." And in fact, containment was probably
not "sustainable over the long run." It was "a costly policy, in
economic and strategic terms." The pattern of the previous
years--"Iraqi defiance, followed by force mobilization on our part,
followed by Iraqi capitulation"--had left "the international community
vulnerable to manipulation by Saddam." The longer the standoff
continued, Berger warned, "the harder it will be to maintain"
international support. Nor was there any question what Saddam would do
if and when containment collapsed. "Saddam's history of aggression,
and his recent record of deception and defiance, leave no doubt that
he would resume his drive for regional domination if he had the
chance. Year after year, in conflict after conflict, Saddam has proven
that he seeks weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, in order
to use them."
O sea, que no es una cuestión moral o siquiera democrática. Es una
cuestión del viejo juego geopolítico, tipo siglo XIX. Poner a un
gobierno pro americano para dar ejemplo en la región. "Como Clnton no
lo hizo, vamos a hacerlo nosotros, con o sin justificación. Cojamos
esa ola de 35 metros después de las torres gemelas y lleguemos en
nuestra tabla de surf a Bagdad", curioso que no les recibiesen con
Caipirinhas o Mojitos en la arena, sino con Bloody Maries...
The truth is that the European Union is never likely to replace NATO.
As the Europeans know, any European security regime that does not
include the United States will almost certainly be pulled in the
direction of either Berlin or Moscow. No exclusively European
organization can do what NATO has done so successfully: contain the
traditional great power rivalries of Europe. Simply put, it is NATO
which has provided the very stability in Europe that makes the EU's
own efforts possible.
As the 20th century comes to a close, the United States stands as the
world's preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold
War, it now faces a security environment that is defined as much by
strategic opportunities as threats. America's core strategic interest
lies in preserving and, where feasible, expanding the current
favorable security environment. NATO's expansion is a critical step in
maintaining an American preeminence that is in our interest, and the
Of course, the Blair Government's overall goal is to balance British
Atlanticism with a commitment to Europe. To do so, London wants to
both maintain NATO's central role in European security, while working
within the EU to help make it a more outward-looking and effective
organization. And while this sounds fine in theory, it falls short in
practice. As long as France holds adamantly to a position, and Germany
supports it, Britain has only two real choices: break with the
French-German consensus, causing a major rift within the EU, or
compromise with it. Hence, as long as Paris knows that Blair cares
about being a good "European" as much as being a solid "Atlanticist,"
it will be in position to determine what being a "good" European is.
Over time, this dynamic cannot help but give momentum to the French
agenda of undermining NATO's place in European security - as we have
now seen with the decision to go forward with this independent
planning command within the EU.
The decision to establish an independent EU defense planning
organization is a small but important precedent that needs to be
challenged. The irony is, this is happening precisely at a time when
the Bush Administration has reversed its attitude of "benign neglect"
towards NATO - by creating new military capabilities, and reforming
command structures and basing. Both London and Berlin should be aware
that, by "compromising" with the French agenda on these matters, they
may be undermining the very institution - NATO - that is key to their
own desire to see American power exercised more, not less, within
We made substantially the same argument in a January 1998 letter to
President Clinton, a letter whose signatories included ---->***Donald
Rumsfeld***<----, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, and Robert
Como puedes leer, los EEUU nos dan tres opciones:
que nos manden desde Washington, Berlín o Moscú y su conclusión es
lógica ---> desde Washington.
Realpolitik llevada al extremo, Moltke, Bismark, Napoleón, el Kaiser
Guillermo y la reina Victoria estarían orgullosos.